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Abstract. The behavior of complex networks under failure or attack depends strongly on the specific
scenario. Of special interest are scale-free networks, which are usually seen as robust under random failure
but appear to be especially vulnerable to targeted attacks. In recent studies of public transport networks of
fourteen major cities of the world it was shown that these systems when represented by appropriate graphs
may exhibit scale-free behavior [C. von Ferber et al., Physica A 380, 585 (2007), Eur. Phys. J. B 68, 261
(2009)]. Our present analysis, focuses on the effects that defunct or removed nodes have on the properties
of public transport networks. Simulating different directed attack strategies, we derive vulnerability criteria
that result in minimal strategies with high impact on these systems.
PACS. 02.50.-r Probability theory, stochastic processes, and statistics – 07.05.Rm Data presentation and
visualization: algorithms and implementation – 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees
1 Introduction
The question of resilience or vulnerability of a complex
network [1] against failure of its parts has, beside purely
academic interest a whole range of important practical im-
plications. In what follows below any such failure will be
called an attack. In practice, the origin of the attack and
its scenario may differ to large extent, ranging from ran-
dom failure, when a node or a link in a network is removed
at random to a targeted destruction, when the most in-
fluential network constituents are removed according to
their operating characteristics. The notion of attack vul-
nerability of complex networks originates from studies of
computer networks and was coined to denote the decrease
of network performance as caused by the removal of either
nodes or links. The behavior of a complex network under
attack has been observed to drastically differ from that of
regular lattices. Early evidence of this fact was found in
particular for real world networks that show scale-free be-
havior: the world wide web and the internet [2,3], as well
as metabolic [4], food web [5], and protein [6] networks. It
appeared that these networks display a high degree of ro-
bustness against random failure. However, if the scenario
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is changed towards targeted attacks, the same networks
may appear to be especially vulnerable [7,8].
Essential progress towards a theoretical description of
the attack vulnerability of complex networks is due to the
application of the tools and concepts of percolation phe-
nomena [9]. On a lattice percolation occurs e.g. when at a
given concentration of bonds a spanning cluster appears.
This concentration cperc which is determined by an appro-
priate ensemble average in the thermodynamic limit is the
so-called percolation threshold which is in general lattice
dependent. On a general network the corresponding phe-
nomenon is the emergence of a giant connected component
(GCC) i.e. a connected subnetwork which in the limit of
an infinite network contains a finite fraction of the net-
work. For a random graph where given vertices are linked
at random this threshold has been shown to be reached at
one bond per vertex [10]. However the distribution p(k)
of the degrees k of vertices in a random graph is Pois-
sonian. A more general criterion applicable to networks
with given degree distribution p(k) but otherwise random
linking between vertices has been proposed by Molloy and
Reed [11,7,8]. For such equilibrium networks a GCC can
be shown to be present if
〈k(k − 2)〉 ≥ 0 (1)
with the appropriate ensemble average 〈. . .〉 over networks
with given degree distribution. Defining the Molloy-Reed
parameter as the ratio of the moments of the degree dis-
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tribution
κ(k) ≡ 〈k2〉/〈k〉 (2)
the percolation threshold can then be determined by
κ(k) = 2 at cperc. (3)
Taken that for scale-free networks the degree distribution
obeys power law scaling
p(k) ∼ k−γ (4)
one finds that the second moment 〈k2〉 diverges for γ < 3.
Thus, the value γ = 3 separates two different regimes for
the percolation on equilibrium scale free networks [7]. In-
deed, for infinite equilibrium scale-free networks κ(k) (2)
remains finite for γ > 3, however for γ < 3 a GCC is
found to exist at any concentration of removed sites: the
network appears to be extremely robust to random re-
moval of nodes. Therefore, observed transitions for real-
world systems [2,3,4,5,6] from the theoretical standpoint
may be seen as finite-size effects or resulting from essen-
tial degree-degree correlations. The tolerance of scale-free
networks to intentional attacks (when the highest degree
nodes are removed) was studied in Ref. [12]. It was shown
that even networks with γ < 3 may be sensitive to inten-
tional attacks.
Obviously, the above theoretical results apply to ideal
complex networks and for ensemble averages and may be
confirmed within certain accuracy when applied to dif-
ferent individual real-world networks. Not only finite-size
effects are the origin of this discrepancy [13]. Furthermore,
even networks of similar type (e.g. of similar node degree
distribution and size) may be characterized by a large va-
riety of other characteristics. While some of them may
have no impact on the percolation properties [14], others
do modify their behavior under attack, as empirically re-
vealed in Ref. [15] for two different real-world scale-free
networks (computer and collaboration networks). There-
fore, an empirical analysis of the behavior of different real-
world networks under attack appears timely and will allow
not only to elaborate scenarios for possible defence mech-
anisms of operating networks but also to create strategies
of network constructions, that are robust to attacks of
various types.
In this paper, we present results of the analysis of the
behavior of networks of public transport in large cities
(public transport networks, PTNs) and consider attacks
by various scenarios. To our knowledge the resilience of
PTNs under attack has so far not been treated in terms
of complex network concepts. Furthermore, in parallel we
analyze a number of complex networks of the same type.
Previous analysis usually focussed on a single instance of
a network of given type [16]. Our study intends to show
that even within a sample of several networks that were
created for the same purpose, namely PTNs, one may ob-
serve essential diversity with respect to the behavior under
attacks of various scenarios.
As we have mentioned above, the attack resilience of
a network may be tested within a variety of different at-
tack scenarios. In a given one, a list of nodes ordered by
decreasing degree may be prepared for the unperturbed
network and the attack successively removes vertices ac-
cording to this original list [17,18]. In a slightly different
scenario the vertex degrees are recalculated and the list
is reordered after each removal step [2]. In initial stud-
ies only little difference between these two scenarios was
observed [8], however further analysis showed [15,19] that
attacks according to recalculated lists often turn out to
be more harmful than the attack strategies based on the
initial list, suggesting that the network structure changes
as important vertices or edges are removed. Other scenar-
ios consider attacks following an order imposed by other
measures of the centrality of a node, e.g. the so-called be-
tweenness centrality [15]. In particular for the world-wide
airport network, it has been shown recently [20,21] that
nodes with higher betweenness play a more important role
in keeping the network connected than those with high
degree. In our study, we will make use of the scenarios
proposed so far as well as develop further algorithms to
perform network attacks.
The paper is organized as follows, in the next Sec-
tion we describe the database, define observables in terms
of which we are going to follow the changes in the net-
work properties under attacks, and describe the different
attack strategies we will use. We display our principal re-
sults in sections 3, 4. There, we formulate criteria that al-
low to estimate the resilience of networks against attacks
and discuss behavior of the PTNs during attacks follow-
ing different strategies, outlining the most effective ones.
Conclusions and an outlook are given in Section 5.
2 Databases, observables, and attack
strategies
This study continues our analysis of the properties of PTNs
initiated in Refs. [22,23,24]. As in these works, we rely on
the publicly available information about PTNs of a set of
fourteen major cities of the world [25]. Our choice for the
selection of these cities was motivated by the idea to col-
lect network samples from cities of different geographical,
cultural, and economical background. In Table 1 we give
some information summarizing the empirical analysis of
some of the properties of the PTNs under consideration.
There are various ways to represent a PTN in terms
of a graph [26]. These different representations allow for a
comprehensive analysis of various PTN properties reflect-
ing their operating functions. It is natural to perform the
analysis of PTN attack resilience in terms of these rep-
resentations. These are briefly summarized in Fig. 1. For
the purpose of the present analysis, we will make use of
the so-called L and P-space graphs. In L-space represen-
tation [26] the PTN is represented by a graph with nodes
that correspond to the stations, whereas links correspond
to connections between stations within one stop distance
(Fig. 1b). In the P-space [27] all station-nodes that be-
long to the same route form of a complete subgraph of
the network (Fig. 1c).
Let us take the L-space representation to introduce
the observables we will use to quantify the PTN behavior
B. Berche et al.: Resilience of public transport networks against attacks 3
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Fig. 1. (color online) a: a simple public transport map. Stations A-F are serviced by routes No 1 (shaded orange), No 2 (white),
and No 3 (dark blue). b: L-space graph. c: P-space graph, the complete sub-graph corresponding to route No 1 is highlighted
(shaded orange).
City Type N R 〈kL〉 ℓ
max
L 〈ℓL〉 cL κ
(z)
L
κ
(k)
L
γL 〈kP〉 ℓ
max
P 〈ℓP〉 cP κ
(z)
P
κ
(k)
P
γP
Berlin BSTU 2992 211 2.58 68 18.5 52.8 1.96 3.16 (4.30) 56.61 5 2.9 41.9 11.47 84.51 (5.85)
Dallas B 5366 117 2.18 156 52.0 55.0 1.28 2.35 5.49 100.58 8 3.2 48.6 11.23 145.65 (4.67)
Du¨sseldorf BST 1494 124 2.57 48 12.5 24.4 1.96 3.16 3.76 59.01 5 2.6 19.7 10.56 91.17 (4.62)
Hamburg BFSTU 8084 708 2.65 156 39.7 254.7 1.85 3.26 (4.74) 50.38 11 4.7 132.2 7.96 79.43 4.38
Hong Kong B 2024 321 3.59 60 11.0 60.3 3.24 5.34 (2.99) 125.67 4 2.2 11.7 10.20 232.73 (4.40)
Istanbul BST 4043 414 2.30 131 29.7 41.0 1.54 2.69 4.04 76.88 6 3.1 41.5 10.59 140.13 (2.70)
London BST 10937 922 2.60 107 26.5 320.6 1.87 3.22 4.48 90.60 6 3.3 90.0 16.94 166.95 3.89
Los Angeles B 44629 1881 2.37 210 37.1 645.3 1.59 2.73 4.85 97.99 11 4.4 399.6 17.21 159.86 3.92
Moscow BEST 3569 679 3.32 27 7.0 127.4 6.25 7.91 (3.22) 65.47 5 2.5 38.0 26.48 130.65 (2.91)
Paris BS 3728 251 3.73 28 6.4 78.5 5.32 6.93 2.62 50.92 5 2.7 59.6 24.06 88.89 3.70
Rome BT 3961 681 2.95 87 26.4 163.4 2.02 3.67 (3.95) 69.05 6 3.1 41.4 11.34 108.08 (5.02)
Sao˜ Paolo B 7215 997 3.21 33 10.3 268.0 4.17 5.95 2.72 137.46 5 2.7 38.2 19.61 333.73 (4.06)
Sydney B 1978 596 3.33 34 12.3 82.9 2.54 4.37 (4.03) 42.88 7 3.0 33.6 7.79 74.63 (5.66)
Taipei B 5311 389 3.12 74 20.9 186.2 2.42 4.02 (3.74) 236.65 6 2.4 15.4 12.96 415.46 (5.16)
Table 1. Some characteristics of the PTNs analyzed in this study. Types of transport taken into account: Bus, Electric trolleybus,
Ferry, Subway, Tram, Urban train; N : number of stations; R: number of routes. The following characteristics are given in L-
and P-spaces, as indicated by the subscripts: 〈k〉 (mean node degree); ℓmax, 〈ℓ〉 (maximal and mean shortest path length); c
(relation of the mean clustering coefficient to that of the classical random graph of equal size); κ(z), κ(k) (c.f. Eqs. (2), (14)); γ
(an exponent in the power law (4) fit, bracketed values indicate less reliable fits, see text). More data is given in [23].
under attack. Keep in mind however, that in our analysis
presented in Section 3 we will deal also with the P-space.
There are two intrinsically connected questions that natu-
rally arise when one wants to describe quantitatively how
a certain network changes when its nodes are removed [28].
The first is how to choose the ’order-parameter’ variable
that signals the quantitative change in the network be-
havior (i.e. the break down of the network), the second is
how to locate the value of concentration of removed nodes
at which this change occurs. As we have mentioned in the
introduction, in a theoretical description a useful quan-
tity is the GCC: its disappearance can be associated with
a network breakdown. Strictly speaking, the GCC is well-
defined only in the N → ∞ limit, therefore in practice
dealing with a network of a finite size N it is substituted
by the size of the largest connected component. We will
use in the following its normalized value defined by:
S = N1/N, (5)
with N and N1 being number of nodes of the network and
of its largest component correspondingly. By definition
(5), a largest component is always present in a network
of non-zero size. A useful quantity to measure network
connectivity is the average shortest path:
〈ℓ〉 =
2
N(N − 1)
∑
i>j
ℓ(i, j), (6)
where ℓ(i, j) is the length of a shortest path from node i
to j and the sum spans all pairs i, j of sites of the network.
However, 〈ℓ〉 is ill-defined for a disconnected network. Al-
ternatively, one can suitably define the mean inverse short-
est path length [15] by:
〈ℓ−1〉 =
2
N(N − 1)
∑
i>j
ℓ−1(i, j), (7)
with ℓ−1(i, j) = 0 if nodes i, j are disconnected. As one
can see, Eq. (7) is well-defined even for a disconnected
network and as such can be used to trace changes of net-
work behavior under attack. To give an example, we show
in Fig. 2 how the largest component fraction S, Eq. (5)
and the mean inverse shortest path length 〈ℓ−1〉, Eq. (7),
change upon random removal of nodes in each of fourteen
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Fig. 2. (color online). L-space. Random scenario. Size of the largest cluster S (a.) and an average inverse mean shortest path
length 〈ℓ−1〉 (b.) as functions of a fraction of removed nodes c normalized by their values at c = 0.
PTNs selected for our study. More precisely, we measure
these quantities as functions of the fraction of removed
nodes c starting from the unperturbed network (c = 0)
and eliminating at random step-by-step 1 % of the nodes
up to c = 1. In what follows below we will call this scenario
a random scenario.
Already this first attack attempt brings about inter-
esting (and in part unexpected) PTN features. Namely:
(i) different PTNs react on random removal of their nodes
in different ways, that range from rapid abrupt breakdown
(Dallas) to a slow almost linear decrease (Paris);
(ii) although qualitatively similar, the observed impact of
the attack differs depending on which variable is used as
indicator, either S or 〈ℓ−1〉. Ordering the PTNs by their
vulnerability, this order may thus differ depending on the
applied indicator;
(iii) up to c = 1, there is no general ’percolation threshold’
concentration of removed nodes c at which S (or 〈ℓ−1〉)
vanishes that would hold for all PTNs. Rather for some
individual PTNs one observes various values of c at which
these PTNs show abrupt changes of their properties.
Figs. 2 a,b display how the different PTNs react on
a random removal of their nodes. Obviously, the question
immediately arises how this behavior changes if one re-
moves the nodes not at random, but following a given or-
der or scheme (we call this the scenario of the attack). As
we have mentioned in the introduction, a number of differ-
ent attack scenarios have been proposed [2,8,15,17,18,19,20,21,24].
These are generally based on the intuitive assumption that
the largest impact on a network is caused by the removal
of its most ’important’ nodes. A number of indicators have
been developed in particular in applications of graph the-
ory for social science to measure the importance of a node.
Besides the node degree kj , which is equivalent to the
number of nearest neighbors z1(j) of a given node j, differ-
ent centralities have been introduced for this purpose. In
particular, the closeness CC(j), graph CG(j), stress CS(j),
and betweenness centralities CB(j) of a node j are defined
as follows (see e.g. [29]):
CC(j) =
1∑
t∈N ℓ(j, t)
, (8)
CG(j) =
1
maxt∈N ℓ(j, t)
, (9)
CS(j) =
∑
s6=j 6=t∈N
σst(j), (10)
CB(j) =
∑
s6=j 6=t∈N
σst(j)
σst
. (11)
In Eqs. (8)–(10), ℓ(j, t) is the length of a shortest path
between the nodes j, t that belong to the networkN , σst is
the number of shortest paths between the two nodes s, t ∈
N , and σst(j) is the number of shortest paths between
nodes s and t that go through the node j. Alternatively,
one may measure the importance of a given node j by
the number of its second nearest neighbors z2(j) or its
clustering coefficient C(j). The latter is the ratio of the
number of links Ej between the kj nearest neighbors of j
and the maximal possible number of mutual links between
them:
C(j) =
2Ej
kj(kj − 1)
. (12)
Removing important nodes according to lists prepared
in the order of decreasing node degrees k, centralities (8)–
(11), number of their second nearest neighbors z2, and
increasing clustering coefficient C defines seven different
attack scenarios. As we have already mentioned in the
introduction, the scenarios can be either implemented ac-
cording to lists prepared for the initial PTN before the
attacks (we will indicate the corresponding scenario by a
superscript i, e.g. CiB) or by lists rebuilt by recalculating
the order of the remaining nodes after each step. Together,
this leads to fourteen different attack scenarios. In addi-
tion, we will keep the above described random scenario
(denoted further as RV) and add one scenario more, re-
moving a randomly chosen neighbor of a randomly chosen
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Fig. 3. (color online). Largest component size of the PTN of
Paris as function of the fraction of removed nodes for different
attack scenarios. Each curve corresponds to a different sce-
nario as indicated in the legend. Lists of removed nodes were
prepared according to their degree k, closeness CC , graph CG,
stress CS, and betweenness CB centralities, clustering coeffi-
cient C, and next nearest neighbors number z2. A superscript
i refers to lists prepared for the initial PTN before the attack.
RV and RN denote the removal of a random vertex (RV) or of
its randomly chosen neighbor (RN), respectively.
node (RN). The latter scenario appears to be effective for
immunization problems [30] and it is based on the fact,
that in this way nodes with a high number of neighbors
will be selected with higher probability. Note that in this
scenario only a neighbor node is removed and not the ini-
tially chosen one.
All together, this defines sixteen different scenarios to
attack a network and we apply these to all fourteen PTNs
that form our database. A typical result for a single PTN
is displayed in Fig. 3. Here, we show how the largest con-
nected component size S of the Paris PTN changes under
the influence of the above described attack scenarios. Al-
ready from this plot one may discriminate between the
most effective scenarios that result in a fast decrease of
the largest component size (those governed by between-
ness and stress centralities, node degree, and next nearest
neighbors number – see the Figure) and the less harmful
ones. In the following, instead of displaying the results of
all attacks for all different PTNs we will focus on the re-
sults of the most effective scenarios comparing them with
those of random failure as introduced by the random sce-
nario. As outlined in the introduction, we make use of dif-
ferent PTN representations (different ’spaces’ of Fig. 1).
In the following section, we present the analysis of PTN
resilience in the L-space representation.
3 Results in L-space
The L-space representation of a PTN is a graph that rep-
resents each station by a node, a link between nodes indi-
cates that there is at least one route that services the two
corresponding stations consecutively. No multiple links are
allowed (see Fig. 1b). Therefore, attacks in the L-space
correspond to situations, in which given public transport
stations cease to operate for all means of traffic that go
through them. Note however, that in this representation,
the removal of a station node does not otherwise interfere
with the operation of a route that includes this station.
It rather splits this route into two (operating) pieces. An
alternative situation will be considered in the forthcoming
section.
In order to answer some of the questions raised in Sec-
tion 2, let us return to Fig. 3, where the impact on the
largest component size S of the PTN of Paris is shown
for sixteen different attack scenarios as function of the
fraction of removed nodes. As we have already remarked,
for this PTN the most influential are the scenarios where
nodes are removed according to lists ordered by CB, k,
CS , k
i, CiB , C
i
S (we list the characteristics in a decreas-
ing order of effectiveness of the corresponding scenario).
For a small value of c (c < 0.07) these scenarios cause
practically indistinguishable impact on S with a linear
behavior S ∼ (1 − c). As c increases, deviations from the
linear behavior arise and the impact of different scenarios
start to vary. In particular, there appear differences be-
tween the role played by the nodes with highest value of k
and highest betweenness centrality CB. Whereas the first
quantity is a local one, i.e. it is calculated from properties
of the immediate environment of each node, the second
one is global. Moreover, the k-based strategy aims to re-
move a maximal number of edges whereas the CB-based
strategy aims to cut as many shortest paths as possible.
In addition, there arise differences between the ’initial’
and ’recalculated’ scenarios, suggesting that the network
structure changes as important nodes are removed. Simi-
lar behavior of S(c) is observed for all PTNs included in
this study, with certain peculiarities in the order of effec-
tiveness of different attack scenarios. Note however, that
the difference between ’initial’ and ’recalculated’ scenarios
is less evident for strategies based on local characteristics,
as e.g. the node degree or the number of second nearest
neighbors (c.f. curves for k, ki and z2, z
i
2, respectively).
This difference between initial and recalculated charac-
teristics is even more pronounced for the centrality-based
scenarios.
Now let us return to some of the observations of Sec-
tion 2. Namely, we noted that the observed impact of an
attack may differ depending on which observable is used
as the ’order-parameter’ variable (c.f. Fig. 2 where this is
shown for the RV attack scenario taking either S or 〈ℓ−1〉
as ’order-parameter’). Similar differences we observe also
in the case of the other scenarios. For the sake of unique-
ness in the following we will use the value of S to measure
the effectiveness of a given attack. This choice is moti-
vated by several reasons: (i) in an infinite network limit
S defines an order parameter of the classical percolation
problem [9]; (ii) differences between network resilience as
judged e.g. by the behavior of S or by that of 〈ℓ−1〉 are
not significant enough to be a subject of special analysis
(at least not for the PTNs we consider); (iii) considering S
naturally leads to other useful characteristics that allow to
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Fig. 4. (color online). L-space. Recalculated highest degree scenario. a. behavior of the maximal shortest path ℓmax for the
PTNs of Paris and London. Note the characteristic peaks that occur at c = 0.13 (Paris) and c = 0.06 (London). b. Size of
largest connected cluster S as function of a fraction of removed nodes for the same networks. The arrows indicate the values of
c at which the peak for ℓmax appears.
estimate the PTN operating ability and its segmentation.
Let us stop to elaborate the latter point in more detail.
As we have already emphasized, there is no well defined
’percolation threshold’ concentration of removed nodes
cperc at which S (or 〈ℓ−1〉) vanishes (see Figs. 2, 3) which
could serve as evidence of a break down of the largest
PTN component and hence of the loss of operating ability
[31]. In Ref. [24] it has been proposed to use the behavior
of maximal shortest path length ℓmax as a possible indi-
cator of the network break down. This was based on the
observation, that as the concentration of removed nodes
c increases, the value of ℓmax for different PTNs displays
similar typical behavior: initial growth and then an abrupt
decrease when a certain threshold is reached (see e.g. Fig.
4 a where this value is shown for the recalculated highest
degree attack scenario of the PTNs of Paris and London).
Obviously, removing the nodes initially increases the path
lengths as deviations from the original shortest paths need
to be taken into account. Further removing nodes then
at some point leads to the breakup of the network into
smaller components on which the paths are naturally lim-
ited by the size of these components which explains the
sudden decrease of their lengths. For comparison, in Fig.
4 b we show how the value of S changes under the recal-
culated highest degree scenario for the above PTNs.
Being certainly useful for many instances of the PTNs
analyzed, the above ℓmax-based criterion cannot serve as
an universal tool to determine the region of c, where the
network stops to operate. One of the reasons is that for
certain PTNs (as well as for certain attack scenarios) we
have found that ℓmax does not show a pronounced maxi-
mum, but rather shows several maxima at different values
of c. Therefore, to devise a criterion which may be equally
well used for any of the networks we decided to define
characteristic concentration of removed nodes cs at which
the size of the largest component S decreases to one half
of its initial value. This characteristic concentration al-
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Fig. 5. (color online). L-space. Random scenario. Size of the
largest cluster S normalized by its value at c = 0 as function
of a fraction of removed nodes. From this figure it is easy to
define the fraction of nodes cs which satisfies Eq. (13).
lows us to compare the effective robustness of different
PTNs or of the same PTN when different attack scenar-
ios are applied. In what follows below, we will call this
concentration the segmentation concentration cs, with the
obvious condition:
S(cs) =
1
2
S(c = 0). (13)
In Fig. 5 we plot the size of the largest connected com-
ponent S for different PTNs as function of the fraction of
removed nodes c for the random vertex scenario (RV) in
L-space. The choice of the lowest S value S = 1/2 in this
figure enables one to find the value cs as the crossing point
of S(c) with the horizontal axis. The values of cs obtained
for this scenario are given in the last column of Table 2.
Note that the PTNs under consideration react on ran-
dom attack in many different ways: some of them slowly
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City cs cs cs cs cs cs
Berlin .060 CB .065 k
i .065 CS .070 k .075 z2 .220 RV
Dallas .025 ki .030 k .030 CB .045 z2 .055 z
i
2 .090 RV
Du¨sseldorf .075 CB .080 k .080 k
i .095 CS .105 z2 .240 RV
Hamburg .040 CB .040 CC .045 CS .045 k
i .060 z2 .150 RV
Hong Kong .030 CB .040 CC .050 z
i
2 .060 CS .090 k
i .300 RV
Istanbul .025 CS .030 CC .030 CB .035 k
i .035 k .140 RV
London .055 k .060 ki .065 CB .075 CC .085 z2 .175 RV
Los Angeles .040 k .060 ki .065 z2 .075 CB .100 z
i
2 .130 RV
Moscow .070 CB .085 CS .085 k .085 k
i .100 CC .350 RV
Paris .105 CB .120 k .125 CS .130 k
i .140 CiB .375 RV
Rome .050 CB .060 CC .065 k .065 k
i .085 CS .215 RV
Sao˜ Paolo .040 k .040 ki .045 CB .060 CS .060 C
i
S .320 RV
Sydney .040 CB .040 CC .065 CS .075 k
i .085 CG, k .350 RV
Taipei .105 CB .105 CG .115 k .120 k
i .120 CC .240 RV
Table 2. Segmentation concentration cs for different attack scenarios applied to different PTNs. For each city, the Table
displays the results of the five most destructive attack scenarios ordered by increasing values of cs. The scenario is indicated
after corresponding value of cs. The scenarios are abbreviated by the name of the characteristics used to prepare the lists of
removed nodes (see Sec. 2 for detailed explanation). In the last column the value of cs for the random scenario (RV) is shown.
decrease without any abrupt changes in S (like PTNs of
Paris, Moscow, Sydney) while others are characterized by
rather fast decay of S (Dallas, Los Angeles, Istanbul).
Now, applying these attacks according to the sixteen
scenarios described above we are in the position to dis-
criminate them by their degree of destruction and to sin-
gle out those with the highest impact on each of the PTNs
considered. To this end, for each PTN we give in Ta-
ble 2 the segmentation concentration cs for the five most
harmful attack scenarios. The obtained values of cs are
given in increasing order. Near each value we denote the
scenario that was implemented. Our analysis reveals the
most harmful scenarios as those targeted at nodes with the
highest values of either the node degree k, the between-
ness centrality CB, the next nearest neighbor number z2,
or the stress centrality CS recalculated after each step of
the attack.
It is instructive to observe correlations between the
characteristics of unperturbed PTNs (see Table 1) and
their robustness to attacks. Such correlations may allow
for an a priory estimate of the resilience of a network with
respect to attacks. As discussed in the introduction, per-
colation theory for uncorrelated networks predicts that
the value of the Molloy-Reed parameter κ(k), Eq. (2), can
be used to measure the distance to the percolation point
κ(k) = 2. We may therefore expect that networks with a
higher value of κ(k) show higher resilience. To this end let
us first compare the values of cs for certain scenarios with
the value of κ(k) for the unperturbed PTN. Before doing
this let us note that for an uncorrelated network the value
of κ(k) can be equally represented by the ratio between
the mean next neighbors number of a node z1 (which is
by definition equal to the mean node degree 〈k〉) and the
mean second nearest neighbors number z2:
κ(z) = z2/z1. (14)
Indeed, given that for such a network (see e.g. [1])
z2 = 〈k
2〉 − 〈k〉, (15)
one can rewrite (3) as:
κ(z) = 1 at cperc. (16)
The relation κ(k) = κ(z) + 1 holds only approximately
for the real-world networks we consider in our study, as
one can see, e.g., from the Table 1. In Fig. 6a we com-
pare both quantities κ(k), κ(z) for unperturbed PTNs with
the corresponding segmentation concentration cs for the
random attack scenario. Within the expected scatter of
data one can definitely observe a general tendency of cs
to increase with both κ(k) and κ(z): the higher the value
of κ for an unperturbed network, the more robust it is
to random removal of its vertices. This conclusion, how-
ever with a more pronounced scatter of data even holds if
one repeats the same analysis for the case of the scenario
based on recalculated node degrees, as shown in Fig. 6b.
Again, one observes cs to increase with increasing κ. For
the betweenness-based attack scenarios the data is even
more scattered and a prediction based on the a priori cal-
culated ratios is unreliable.
Another useful observation concerns the correlation
between the PTN attack resilience and the node-degree
distribution exponent γ (4). As we have observed in the
previous studies [22,23] some of the PTNs under consid-
eration are scale-free: their node-degree distributions have
been fitted to a power-law decay (4) with the exponents
shown in Table 1. Others are characterized rather by an
exponential decay, but up to a certain accuracy they can
also be approximated by a power-law behavior (then, the
corresponding exponent is shown in Table 1 in brackets).
In Fig. 7a we show the correlation between the fitted node-
degree distribution exponent γ and cs for the random at-
tack scenario. Filled circles correspond to scale-free PTNs,
open circles correspond to the PTNs where the scale-free
behavior is less pronounced. It is interesting to observe,
that even if we include the PTNs which are better de-
scribed by the exponential decay of the node-degree dis-
tributions, there is a notable tendency to find PTNs with
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Fig. 6. L-space. Correlations between the ratio κ, Eq. (3), (14) and segmentation concentration cs. Open circles: κ
(k) = 〈k2〉/〈k〉,
filled circles: κ(z) = z2/z1. The lines serve as guides to observe the tendency of cs to increase for higher values of κ. a. Random
scenario. Most out-of-range are the points cs = 0.35, κ
(z) = 2.54, κ(k) = 4.37 (Sydney) and cs = 0.35, κ
(z) = 6.25, κ(k) = 7.91
(Moscow). b. Recalculated node-degree scenario. Two PTNs are out of range: cs = 0.04, κ
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and cs = 0.08, κ
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Fig. 7. L-space. Correlations between the node-degree distribution exponent γ and segmentation concentration cs. Filled circles:
scale-free PTNs, open circles: PTNs with less pronounced power-law decay. Solid lines serve as guides to observe the tendency
of cs to decay with an increase of γ. a. Random scenario. Most out of range are the points at cs = 0.24, γ = (5.16) (Taipei) and
at cs = 0.35, γ = 4.03 (Sydney). b. Recalculated node-degree scenario. Most out of range are the points at cs = 0.04, γ = 2.72
(Sao Paolo) and at cs = 0.115, γ = (5.16) (Taipei).
smaller values of γ to be more resilient as indicated by
larger values of cs. This tendency is again confirmed if one
considers the recalculated node degree attack scenario, as
shown in Fig. 7b.
The above observed correlation between the exponent
γ that characterizes the unperturbed network (i.e. a PTN
at c = 0) and the segmentation concentration cs at which
however the PTN is to a large part unperturbed indicates
that some global properties of the node-degree distribu-
tion may remain essentially unchanged when the nodes
are removed (i.e. a scale-free distribution remains scale-
free as c increases, 0 < c < cs). To check that assumption
for the RV scenario, we analyzed the averaged cumulative
node degree distributions for each of the PTNs with 3,5,
and 10 % of removed nodes. The cumulative distribution
P (k) is defined in terms of the node-degree distribution
p(q) (4) as:
P (k) =
kmax∑
q=k
p(q), (17)
with kmax the maximal node degree in the given PTN.
Typical results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 8, for
the PTN of Paris. We compare the cumulative node de-
gree distribution P (k) of the unperturbed PTN with that
of the PTN where a given fraction c part of the nodes
(c = 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1, correspondingly) was removed
according to the random attack scenario (RV). For each
of the concentrations of the removed nodes, P (k) was av-
eraged over 2000 repeated attacks.
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Fig. 8. (color online). L-space. Average cumulative node degree distributions for Paris PTN for the random attack scenario.
Comparison of the initial distribution (red curve, c = 0) with those of the PTNs with c = 0.03, c = 0.05, c = 0.1 (a). Average
cumulative node degree distribution together with statistical errors for c = 0.03 (b), c = 0.05 (c), c = 0.1 (d).
In the first plot, Fig. 8a, we compare the three result-
ing average distributions (for c = 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1) with
the original one (c = 0). One clearly sees that there is
no qualitative or even quantitative (change of exponent)
change of the distributions for any of the three cases. In-
deed, if one has a large set of nodes with a given node-
degree distribution any sufficiently large random subset of
these nodes should have the same distribution; in partic-
ular this holds if one averages these subset distributions
over many instances. The above argument seems to ig-
nore the change of degrees in the subset due to cutting off
those vertices not remaining in the set. However, due to
the random choice of the removed nodes the share of lost
degree will on the average be proportional to the degree
of each vertex: the higher its degree the more probable
it is that one of its neighbors is chosen to be removed
and this probability is proportional to its degree. Thus,
the sum of degrees in the remaining subset is lower; but
the degree distribution P (k) is effectively transformed to
P ′(ck) = nP (k) where c is the probability of any node be-
ing removed and P ′(k) is the distribution in the remain-
ing subset of nodes, n a normalization. For an exponential
distribution this transformation shifts the scale. However,
a scale free distribution keeps its exponent under such a
transformation.
In the other three plots, Figs. 8b-d we show for each
amount of removed nodes the average cumulative distri-
bution together with statistical errors calculated as the
standard deviation within the ensemble of the 2000 in-
stances generated in the sample. Even on the logarithmic
scale these are very small for all but the very high degrees
where fluctuations of small numbers of often less than one
node for a given degree occur.
4 Results in P-space
Let us complement the L-space analysis performed above
by observing the reaction of PTN graphs under attack
when one observes them in another representation. In par-
ticular, we will investigate P-space graphs.
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Fig. 9. (color online). P-space. Random scenario. (a.) size of the largest cluster S and (b.) the average inverse mean shortest
path length 〈ℓ−1〉 as functions of the fraction of removed nodes c normalized by their values at c = 0.
First let us recall that in this representation each node
corresponds to a PTN station, i.e. it has the same interpre-
tation as in the L-space. However, the interpretation of a
link differs from that in the L-space: now all station-nodes
that belong to the same route are connected and thus each
route enters the P-space network as a complete subgraph.
This results in the main peculiarity of the interpretation
of the behavior under attacks of these graphs. Consider as
an example the P-space graph of Fig. 1c and compare it
to the original PTN map, Fig. 1a. Whereas the removal of
station node C in the map (Fig. 1a) disconnects the nodes
B and D, the removal of the same node in the P-space (Fig.
1c) keeps nodes B and D connected, as far as they still be-
long to the same route. Therefore, the removal of nodes in
P-space, performed either in a random way or according
to certain lists, has a different interpretation in compari-
son to that occurring in the L-space. An interpretation of
the removal of nodes in P-space is the following: if a node
is removed, the corresponding stop of the route is can-
celed while the route otherwise keeps operating. If in the
above example the station-node C is removed, route No
2 still keeps operating and station-node B can be reached
from D, only without stopping at C (e.g. the bus takes a
shortcut). In this way, as we will see below, the removal of
nodes in P-space allows us to gain additional insight into
the PTN structure.
As in the case of the L-space representation, we study
the resilience of the P-space PTN graphs to attacks per-
formed following the sixteen different scenarios defined in
Section 3. In Fig. 9 we show the change of the size of the
largest cluster S (a) and the average inverse mean short-
est path length 〈ℓ−1〉 (b) under random attacks (RV). If
one compares this behavior with that observed for the RV
scenario in L-space (see Fig. 2) one sees, that all PTNs
under consideration react in a much more homogeneous
way. In L-space random attacks lead to changes of the
largest connected component S that range from an abrupt
breakdown (Dallas) to a slow smooth decrease (Paris). In
P-space one observes for the same scenario only a decrease
of S which corresponds to the number of removed nodes.
No break-down of this cluster occurs in this scenario. The
value of S(cs) defined by the condition (13) is given in the
last column of Table 3. It is worth to note, that the be-
havior of the mean inverse shortest path length 〈ℓ−1〉 as
function of the fraction c of disabled nodes is also qualita-
tively different between the two RV scenarios in L- (Fig.
2b) and P- (Fig. 9b) spaces. In L-space 〈ℓ−1〉 decreases
in general faster than linearly indicating an increase of
the path length between the nodes as well as partitioning
of the network. In P-space 〈ℓ−1〉 remains for a large part
unperturbed as the nodes of the complete subgraph re-
main essentially connected and the shortest path lengths
remain almost unchanged until only a small fraction of the
network remains.
To further detail the situation, similar as in Section
3, we summarize in Table 3 the outcome of the five most
harmful attack scenarios and compare those with the ran-
dom attack scenario. As it follows from the Table and as
is further supported by Fig. 10, the betweenness-targeted
scenarios appear to be the most harmful. Following this
observation let us investigate the role of the highest be-
tweenness nodes: above all these are the nodes (and not
the highest-k hubs) that control the PTN behavior un-
der attack. The P-space degrees of these high-betweenness
nodes do not essentially differ from those of the hubs,
therefore they cannot be easily distinguished from the
other nodes during attacks according to highest-k sce-
nario. To support this assumption, let us recall that in
the P-space representation each route enters the overall
network as a complete subgraph, with all nodes intercon-
nected. Removing nodes from a complete graph does not
lead to any segmentation. The decrease of the normal-
ized size of this graph will be given by the exact formula
S = 1− c (which is - almost - reproduced by the RV sce-
nario, c.f. Fig. 9a). Under such circumstances a special
role is played by those nodes that join different complete
graphs (different routes). The removal of such nodes will
separate different complete routes and as a result may lead
to network segmentation. Naturally, being between differ-
ent complete subgraphs such nodes are characterized by
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Fig. 10. (color online). P-space, size of the largest cluster S at a: highest degree scenario (recalculated), b: highest betweenness
scenario (recalculated).
City cs cs cs cs cs cs
Berlin .155 CB .175 CC .215 CS .285 C
i .290 CiB .490 RV
Dallas .065 CB .075 CC .095 CS .115 C .130 C
i .490 RV
Du¨sseldorf .160 CB .185 CS .255 CC .295 C
i .300 ki .495 RV
Hamburg .050 CC .065 CB .145 CG .170 C .175 C
i
C .490 RV
Hong Kong .285 CB .295 CS .335 CC .365 C .380 C
i .505 RV
Istanbul .060 CC .060 CB .060 C
i
B .115 C
i
C .175 C .500 RV
London .155 CB .205 CC .305 CG .330 C .350 C
i .495 RV
Los Angeles .065 CB .095 CC .145 CS .145 C
i
B .150 C .480 RV
Moscow .175 CB .255 CC .285 CS .345 C .395 C
i,CiS .495 RV
Paris .115 CB .165 CS .215 CC .235 C
i
B .240 C,C
i .500 RV
Rome .135 CC .160 CB .225 CG .285 CS .305 C .495 RV
Sao˜ Paolo .205 CB ,CC .240 CS .355 CG .365 C .390 C
i .500 RV
Sydney .075 CC .085 CB .105 CS .225 C .240 C
i .510 RV
Taipei .290 CB .320 CS .370 CC .430 CG .440 k,C
i
S .495 RV
Table 3. Segmentation concentration cs for different attack scenarios applied to different PTNs in P-space. For each city,
the Table shows the five most effective attack scenarios ordered by increasing values of cs. The scenario is indicated after
corresponding value of cs. The scenarios are abbreviated by the name of the characteristics used to prepare the lists of removed
nodes (see Sec. 2 for detailed explanation). In the last column the value of cs for the random scenario (RV) is shown.
high centrality indices, as observed above. Moreover, as
far as their direct neighbors belong to different complete
graphs, these neighbors are not connected between each
other resulting in a lower value of the clustering coefficient
C. From Table 3 one sees that attacks based on choosing
nodes with low-C values are very effective in P-space.
To conclude this section, we ask the question if a sim-
ple criterion can be found that allows to predict a priori
the P-space PTN vulnerability. Namely, given the gen-
eral PTN characteristics (see Table 1) can one forecast
resilience against attacks in P-space? The answer is given
by the observation that the networks with low mean short-
est path length 〈ℓP〉 are the best connected in P-space and
hence may be expected to be less vulnerable. Indeed, on
the one hand, for the above example of a complete graph
(a single PTN route) 〈ℓP〉 = 1 and it is extremely robust
to P-space attacks. On the other hand, a high value of
〈ℓP〉 indicates numerous intermediate nodes between dif-
ferent routes. As we have checked above, the targeted re-
moval of such nodes leads to rapid network segmentation.
In support of the above reasoning, in Fig. 11 we plot cs
as function of 〈ℓP〉 for attacks based on the highest be-
tweenness centrality scenario. There, within the expected
scatter of data one observes a clear evidence of the de-
crease of cs with 〈ℓP〉, i.e. networks with higher mean path
length break down at smaller values of c and are thus more
vulnerable.
It is worth to note here, that in P-space it is only
the RV attack that has very similar impact on all PTNs
(see Fig. 9). As we have just observed, similar to the L-
space also in P-space the PTNs manifest different level of
robustness against attacks targeted on the most important
nodes. However, the order of vulnerability changes if one
compares the outcome of the L-space and P-space attacks.
This means that PTNs that were vulnerable in the L-
space may appear to be robust against attacks in P-space.
From Table 3 we see that the PTNs that are most stable
against highest CB-targeted attacks in P-space are the
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Fig. 11. P-space. Correlations between the mean shortest path
length 〈ℓP〉 and segmentation concentration cs in the highest
betweenness centrality scenario. The line serves as a guide to
observe the tendency of cs to decrease with increasing 〈ℓP〉.
PTNs of Hong Kong, Sao˜ Paolo, and Moscow, with cs =
0.285, 0.205, and 0.175, correspondingly. When attacked
in L-space, the PTN of Moscow keeps its robustness: cs =
0.07 during CB-targeted attack, which is one of highest cs
values for the L-space, see Table 2. This is however not
the case for the PTNs of Hong Kong and Sao˜ Paolo. In
L-space, these belong to the most vulnerable PTNs.
5 Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we have studied the behavior of city pub-
lic transportation networks (PTNs) under attacks. In our
analysis we have examined PTNs of fourteen major cities
of the world. The principal motivation behind this study
was to observe the behavior under attack of a sample of
networks that were constructed for the same purpose, to
compare these with available analytical results for perco-
lation of complex networks, and possibly to derive some
conclusions about correlations between PTN characteris-
tics calculated a priory and the resilience to attacks. Fur-
thermore, the resilience behavior of a network against dif-
ferent attack scenarios gives additional insight into the
network architecture, discovering structures on different
scales. This approach has been termed the ’tomography’
of a network [14].
In our study we have also attempted to compare our
results with the predictions of percolation theory on net-
works. Due to the sizes of these systems which are far from
the thermodynamic limit and the rather small sample
of networks no quantitative comparison appeared possi-
ble. However, qualitative predictions about the location of
segmentation thresholds and thus the vulnerability could
be verified. Although our study was not primarily moti-
vated by applications, some of the results and methods
developed within this study may be useful for planning
and risk assessment of PTNs. Our analysis has identified
PTN structures which are especially vulnerable and oth-
ers, which are particulary resilient against attacks. Further
investigation of other relevant network properties may re-
veal mechanisms behind this structural resilience [32]. Fur-
thermore we note that the methods developed here also
allow to identify minimal strategies to obstruct the opera-
tion of the PTN of a city e.g. for the purposes of industrial
action and possibly achieve a successful end of a social
conflict.
To analyze PTN resilience we have applied different
attack scenarios, that range from a random failure to a
targeted destruction, when the most influential network
nodes were removed according to their operating char-
acteristics. To choose the most influential nodes, we have
used different graph theoretical indicators and determined
in such a way the most effective attack scenarios. By our
paper we show that even within a sample of networks that
were created for the same purpose one observes essential
diversity with respect to their behavior under attacks of
various scenarios. Results of our analysis show that PTNs
demonstrate rich variety of behavior under attacks, that
range from smooth decay to abrupt change.
As shown by our study, the impact of attacks may be
measured by different quantities. As a criterion that is
well defined and easily reproducible we choose to define
the segmentation concentration cs to correspond to the
situation where the largest remaining cluster contains one
half of the original nodes of the network. Let us note as
well, that definitely not all of the PTNs analyzed demon-
strated scale-free behavior in P-space (and even less in
L-space). Nevertheless, in spite of the diversity of behav-
ior we clearly see common tendencies in their reaction to
attacks. In particular, this enabled us to propose criteria
that allow an a priori estimate of PTN robustness. In L-
space resilience is indicated by a high value of the Molloy-
Reed parameter κ, Eqs. (2), (14) or by a small value of the
exponent γ, if a power law is observed for the PTN node
degree distribution, in P-space high resilience is indicated
by a small mean shortest path length 〈ℓP〉.
One of possible continuations of our study will be the
analysis of PTN resilience in other graph representations,
than those that were described above.
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